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Changes in Offeror Strategy in
Response to New Laws and
Regulations
Meredith M. Brown*
There have been a number of changes recently in state andfederal laws gov-
erning tender offers as well as certain developments affecting the role of tender
offers as opposed to alternative methods of effecting changes in corporate control
The author undertakes an analysis of thepragmatic effects of these changes on the
conduct of tender offers from theperspective of the offeror's counsel and offers a
practical checklist of items an offeror's counsel must consider in thepreparation of
a tender offer. Finally, he ventures somepredictions concerning thefuture course
of tender offer regulation and litigation.
KEEING ABREAST of new laws and regulations' affecting
tender offer strategy is like watching a close horse race. The
observer, if quick of eye, can spot where things stand at a given
moment; he may even be able to reconstruct how things reached
their present state; he is aware that changes are occurring rapidly;
but he can only guess how things will unfold.
Consider the following scenarios of two recent hostile tender
offers, occurring less than two years apart.
Case 1: Blitzkrieg2
Announcement: On November 18, 1975, without advance
warning, Colt Industries, Inc. announces a cash tender offer for
shares of Garlock Inc. at $32 per share. The offer is scheduled to
expire on November 26-eight days later.
Post-Announcement Developments: Garlock sues Colt, alleg-
ing both securities and antitrust violations. Almost immediately,
A.B. (1961), J.D. (1965), Harvard. The author is a partner with the law firm of
Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons & Gates in New York City and is a Lecturer in Law at Co-
lumbia University School of Law. He is admitted to the New York Bar.
1. Except as noted, this article discusses state and federal tender offer legislation as
of February 1, 1978.
2. The facts of the following tender offer can be found in the following newspaper
articles: Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1975, at 8, coL 2; id., Nov. 20, 1975, at 18, col. 2; id., Nov. 24,
1975, at 3, col 4; Id., Nov. 26, 1975, at 6, col 3; id., Nov. 28, 1975, at 5, col. I.
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AMF announces a proposal to acquire Garlock for AMF stock.
On November 24, Colt sweetens its offer td $35 per share; Garlock
withdraws its opposition; AMF withdraws its proposal.
Termination of Offer: The amended offer expires on Decem-
ber 5, 1975, by which time Colt has 92% of Garlock's stock.
Time Elapsed From Announcement to Termination: 18 days.
Case 2: Trench Warfare3
Announcement: On February 25, 1977, the president of United
Technologies Corporation (UT) expresses to the president of the
Babcock & Wilcox Company (B&W) UT's interest in B&W. On
March 28, UT formally proposes to B&W's directors an offer at
$42 per share. B&W's directors on April 4 inform UT of their re-
jection of UT's offer. On April 5, 1977, UT publicly announces its
intention to make a tender offer for B&W's shares at $42, once the
offer is cleared under applicable state statutes.
Post-Announcement Developments: B&W sues UT in federal
court in Akron, Ohio, under the antitrust and securities laws and
under the Atomic Energy Act. B&W seeks hearings under the
takeover statutes of Ohio, New York, New Jersey, and Arkansas.
Ohio holds hearings and ultimately recommends that the offer
proceed, provided that it remains open for twenty days instead of
the original ten days. The New Jersey Bureau of Securities, by
order affirmed August 3, denies a hearing if withdrawal rights are
broadened. The federal district court in Akron on July 15 denies
B&W's request for an injunction against the offer. The Depart-
ment of Justice brings suit in Hartford, Connecticut, to enjoin the
offer. The suit is transferred to Akron, and the Akron court on
August 4 denies the Department's request for a temporary re-
straining order. That same day UT finally makes the tender offer
at $48 per share. The stated expiration date of the offer is August
25. On August 12, J. Ray McDermott (JRM) offers to buy up to
4.3 million shares at $55 per share. On August 18, UT responds to
JRM's offer by increasing its price to $55. On August 19, JRM
raises its offer to $60. On August 23, UT offers $58. Again JRM
3. The facts of the United Technologies battle for control of Babcock & Wilcox can
be found in these newspaper articles: id., Mar. 30, 1977, at 3, col. 1; id., April 5, 1977, at 3,
col. 1; id., April 6, 1977, at 2, col. 3; id., April 12, 1977, at 3, col. 1; id., July 18, 1977, at 15,
col. 5; id., July 19, 1977, at 10, col. 2; id., Aug. 5, 1977, at 4, col. 2; id., Aug. 15, 1977, at 2,
col. 2; id., Aug. 19, 1977, at 2, col. 2; id., Aug. 22, 1977, at 4, col. 2; id., Aug. 24, 1977, at 2,
col. 2; id., Aug. 25, 1977, at 4, col. 1; id., Aug. 26, 1977, at 4, col. 1; id., Sept. 19, 1977, at 12,
col. 2.
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increases its price, this time to $62.50. On August 25, UT with-
draws its offer.
Time Elapsed from Announcement to Termination: 152 days
from March 28, the day on which UT presented its offer to B&W's
board of directors; 182 days from February 25, the day on which
UT first approached the president of B&W proposing a friendly
acquisition.
From an offeror's perspective the two cases differ as much as
the German invasion of France in 1870 differed from the German
invasion of France in 1914. The object in each case was a swift
conquest. While the offeror attained its objective in the first case,
the second case led to stalemate, attrition, and ultimate defeat.
New laws account in large part for the differences between
these two tender offer scenarios. That state takeover laws were es-
sential to the defeat of United Technologies' bid for Babcock &
Wilcox suggests that this new weapon in the hands of target com-
panies may effect a power shift in the conduct of tender offers.
The recent proliferation of state takeover statutes, however, may
not mark the end of the swift tender offer since the recent, success-
ful constitutional challenge of one such statute has been upheld by
the Fifth Circuit.
Other relatively new changes in tender offer regulation include
a new antitrust act5 and proposed amendments to the tender offer
rules under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 under which
tender offers will remain open for at least fifteen days.6 Moreover,
recent amendments to the Exchange Act require disclosure of
items not previously required including disclosure of certain ac-
quisitions made prior to the tender offer.7 In addition, the SEC
has proposed new rules which would extend federal regulation to
going-private transactions.8 This article will summarize recent de-
velopments in each of these areas and offer some observations on
the extent to which they impose new burdens that shift the bal-
ance of power in a tender offer.
4. Seesection l(d) infra
5. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Hart-Scott-Rodino Act].
6. Proposed rule 14e-2, 41 Fed. Reg. 33,004 (1976).
7. Domestic and Foreign Investment Improved Disclosure Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-213, §§ 201-204, 91 Stat. 1498 (1977) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (g), (h),
78o) (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13 (g), 15 U.S.C. 78m (1976)).
8. Proposed rule 13e-3, 42 Fed. Reg. 60,090 (1977).
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1. Developments in State Takeover Laws9
Recent developments in state takeover laws include both the
wide adoption of protective statutes by an increasing number of
states and the first serious constitutional challenge to any of these
statutes.
a. The Proifferation of State Takeover Laws. State takeover
legislation dates back to 1968 when Virginia enacted the first state
statute specifically addressed to tender offers."0 In 1969 Ohio be-
came the second state to enact a takeover statute, I" and thereafter
a host of states followed suit. Adoption of takeover legislation in
some states was doubtless motivated by a concern for maintaining
existing tax bases. States without tender offer statutes would suffer
from dwindling tax revenues if businesses reincorporated in juris-
dictions offering protective takeover laws.' 2 Whatever the impe-
tus, takeover legislation blossomed. By September 1977 some
thirty-three states had takeover statutes 3 and more were being
9. The scope of this article permits only a cursory outline of state takeover
legislation. For more comprehensive treatment, see: Aranow & Einhorn, State Securities
Regulation of Tender Offers, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 767 (1971); Gibson & Freeman, The
Thirteenth 4nnual Survey of Virginia Law. 1967-1968---Business 4ssociations, 54 VA. L.
REV. 1214 (1968); Langevoort, State Tender Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and
Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213 (1977); Moylan, State Regulation of Tender
Offers, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 687 (1975); Steinberger, New York's Takeover Act, 9 REV. SEC.
REG. 879 (1976); Vaughn, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 3 SEC. L. REv. 475 (1971);
Vaughn, State Tender Offer Rbgulation, 9 REV. SEC. REG. 969 (1976); Vaughn, Tender
Offers in Virginia, 7 REV. SEC. REG. 879 (1974); Vorys, Ohio Tender Offers Bill, 43 OHIO B.
65 (1970); Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap.- State Takeover Statutes and Their
Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1976); Disclosure Problems in Tender Offers and
Freeze-Outs-A Panel, 32 Bus. LAW. 1365 (1977); Symposium, Controlling Corporate
Takeover Bids: State Regulation and the Ohio Approach, 21 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 605
(1970); The Tender Trap: State Takeover BidLegislation, 27 CoRP. J. 291 (1976); Comment,
Tender Offers in Michigan: Has Something New Been Added, 1977 DET. L. REV. 347; Note,
State Takeover Statutes versus Congressional Intent: Preempting the Maze, 5 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 857 (1977); Note, The Indiana Business TakeoverAct, 51 IND. L.J. 1051 (1976); Note,
Commerce Clause Limitations Upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. CALIF. L. REV.
1133 (1974); Note, Take-Over Bids in Virginia, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 323 (1969).
10. VA. CODE §§ 13.1-528 to .1-541 (1977).
11. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.41 (Page Supp. 1977).
12. See, e.g., Proxy statement of Viacom International, Inc. dated March 14, 1975
(seeking shareholder approval of a merger that would change the state of incorporation
from Delaware, which then had no takeover statute, to Ohio, which did).
13. Bartell, State Take-Over Laws:A Survey, in COURSE HANDBOOK FOR PRACTISING
LAW INSTITUTE, NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION (1977). The
states include: Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Ha-
waii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin.
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added to the list.
b. Type of State Takeover Laws. While state takeover stat-
utes vary enormously in their specific provisions, they can be
roughly grouped into three classes according to the type of regula-
tion they impose: notice only, notice and hearing, and notice and
hearing coupled with additional substantive regulation. The three
classes are respectively exemplified by the Delaware, New York,
and New Jersey statutes.
The Delaware statute, a pure notice statute, is also more mod-
est than most of the state statutes in jurisdictional scope, applying
only to offers for shares of corporations organized under its
laws. 14 The statute requires one contemplating a tender offer for a
Delaware corporation to give not less than twenty days' notice to
the target company15 and also requires the offer to remain open at
least twenty days, during which time a depositor (a tendering
shareholder) is free to withdraw his shares.16
The New York statute invokes broader jurisdiction and pro-
vides for a hearing as well as notice. It applies not only to offers
for shares of New York corporations but also to offers for shares
of any corporation "having its principal place of business and sub-
stantial assets" in New York.17 In addition to requiring twenty
days' advance notice,18 the statute requires the offeror to file a
detailed offering statement with the New York Attorney Gen-
eral.19 The Attorney General has the power to hold hearings to
inquire into the adequacy of the disclosures and may delay the
offer during the hearings.20
14. DEL. CoDn tit. 8, § 203(c)(2) (Supp. 1977). There is no such thing as a typical state
takeover statute, but statutes often apply to offers for more than a certain percentage of a
class of equity securities of the target company. Exceptions may be created for. (I) the
acquisition of a limited number of shares, (2) a limited number of offerees, (3) companies
with a limited number of shareholders or less than a specified amount of assets, (4) certain
broker-dealer transactions, (5) certain exchange offers, (6) an offer which the board of
directors of the target recommends for acceptance, (7) purchases by the issuer, (8) offers
exempted by order or rules, and (9) offers for targets in certain highly regulated industries.
Jurisdiction may be predicated on: (I) the incorporation of the target company within the
state, alone or in combination with other factors, (2) the presence in the state of the princi-
pal office or place of business, alone or in combination with other factors, or (3) the pres-
ence of substantial assets in the state.
15. Id. § 203(a)(1).
16. Id. § 203(a)(2).
17. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 1601(a) (McKinney Supp. 1977).
18. Id. § 1602.
19. Id. § 1602-1603.
20. Id. § 1604.
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The New Jersey statute goes beyond the New York statute,
which limits the regulation of tender offers to the mere assurance
of adequate notice and disclosure, by authorizing the state securi-
ties agency to block an offer if its terms are "unfair or inequita-
ble" to the target's shareholders, or if the offeror's plans (even if
fully disclosed) are not in the interest of the target's shareholders
or employees. 21 These additional powers permit shareholders to
be second-guessed with respect to their investment decisions to
tender or retain their shares.
c. The Impact of State Takeover Laws. Early commentators
believed that state takeover statutes would substantially deter hos-
tile offers. In 1969 a draftsman of the Ohio act predicted that "so
far as Ohio and Ohio based corporations are concerned, the cor-
porate takeover as a form of corporate warfare is a thing of the
past."22
The announcement was perhaps premature. Since that time at
least eight hostile tender offers have been made for companies ei-
ther incorporated in Ohio or able to claim "principal place of
business and substantial assets" in Ohio.23 The fact that seven of
the offers occurred after September 1, 1975, may suggest that the
Ohio act served to discourage prospective offerors from targeting
Ohio corporations only when Ohio stood as one of the few states
with a tough takeover statute. As more states adopted similar stat-
utes and the possibility of avoiding the impact of state legislation
lessened, offerors with patience and deep pockets were willing to
take their chances on the vagaries and delays of Ohio administra-
tive procedure.
The Ohio experience indicates that offerors have been willing
to proceed with hostile offers in the face of strong state takeover
laws. Nevertheless, only one of the offerors in the seven hostile
offers involving the Ohio statute since September 1, 1975, suc-
ceeded at the price originally offered.24 In that instance, the of-
21. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-4(a) (West Cure. Supp. 1978).
22. Vorys, Ohio Tender Offers Bill, 43 OHIo B. 65, 73 (1970).
23. See Sparton Corp. offer for Servotronics (announced Dec. 16, 1970); Imetal offer
for Copperweld (announced Sept. 3, 1975); General Cable Corp. offer for Microdot, Inc.
(announced Dec. 3, 1975); Bethlehem Copper Corp. offer for Valley Camp Coal Co. (an-
nounced Feb. 7, 1976); Thrall Car Mfg. Co. offer for Youngstown Steel Door Co. (an-
nounced June 1, 1976); United Technologies Corp. offer for Babcock & Wilcox Co.
(announced April 4, 1977); Esmark, Inc. offer for Inmont Corp. (announced in June 1977).
24. Microdot, Youngstown Steel Door, and Babcock & Wilcox were able to find more
acceptable suitors willing to pay a higher price than the original offerors. Inmont found a
purchaser to buy out Esmark's position in Inmont.
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feror challenged the statute's applicability, and consequently, a
full hearing was never held under the statute." The Ohio experi-
ence therefore illustrates that a strong takeover law has been a
formidable weapon in the hands of incumbent manage-
ment-operating not as a total bar to a particular tender offer, but
as a stalling device giving the target time to take other defensive
measures and to negotiate with alternative suitors. For this reason,
challenges to the constitutionality of state tender offer statutes
may substantially affect the balance of power in a takeover battle.
d. The Great Western United Case. 6  In March 1977
Great Western United Corporation announced its intention to
make a cash tender offer for stock of Sunshine Mining Company.
Sunshine was incorporated in the State of Washington, which has
no takeover law. Sunshine's headquarters and more than 50% of
its assets, however, were in Idaho; a Sunshine subsidiary, incorpo-
rated in Delaware, had its manufacturing facilities in Maryland;
and Sunshine had enough business activities in New York to
make application of the New York takeover law arguable.
Idaho's Director of Finance entered an order staying the pro-
posed offer. Great Western encountered no success in its efforts to
convince Maryland and New York officials to rule that the take-
over statutes of those states did not apply. Exasperated, Great
Western filed a declaratory judgment action in the federal district
court in Dallas, seeking to enjoin officials of Idaho, Maryland,
and New York from applying the laws of their states to the offer
for Sunshine, on the grounds that such an application violated the
commerce clause and that the statutes, as so applied, were pre-
empted by the Williams Act amendments to the Securities Ex-
change Act. 7
25. In the Imetal acquisition of Copperweld, the Ohio Division of Securities filed a
complaint against Imetal's acquisition of Copperweld and obtained a temporary re-
straining order against further activity by Imetal with regard to their tender offer. Imetal
answered by challenging the agency's jurisdiction over their tender offer as well as the
constitutionality of the Ohio statute. Before these issues were settled, the case was resolved
out of court. On the same day this consent judgment was entered, the court decided to
dissolve the restraining order.
26. 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977) affd, No. 77-2809 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 1978). See
generally Case Note, 28 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 955 (1978).
27. 439 F. Supp. at 423-25. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 m(d)-(e), 79 n(d)-((1976);
IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to 1513 (Cum. Supp. 1975); MD. CORP. & Ass'N.s CODE ANN. §§
11-901 to 908 (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1600 -1613 (McKinney Cum.
Supp. 1977).
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On September 2, 1977, Judge Robert M. Hill rendered a deci-
sion dismissing the suit as to Maryland for lack of a case or con-
troversy and as to New York for mootness;2 8 neither state was
seeking to assert the jurisdiction of its act. The judge found the
Idaho defendants properly before the court since their acts pre-
vented Great Western from making an offer to the many Sunshine
shareholders who lived in Texas. On the merits, Judge Hill found
the Idaho statute preempted by the Williams Act because of the
conflicting requirements and purposes of the two acts. He noted
that the Idaho act requires more detailed disclosure than does the
Williams Act: the Idaho act includes a delay mechanism before
the tender offer becomes effective, while the Williams Act deliber-
ately excludes administrative review prior to the actual offer, and
the Idaho act, unlike the Federal act, exempts offers which are
approved by the directors of the target company. On balance, the
court found that the intent of the Idaho act was "to inhibit tender
offers for the benefit of management," rather than allow tender
offers beneficial to the shareholders to proceed.29
The district court also found the application of the Idaho stat-
ute to shareholders outside of Idaho to be inconsistent with the
commerce clause, both for lack of a legitimate state interest and
for the burdens on interstate commerce imposed by the applica-
tion.3°
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to order a stay of
the decision pending appeal, and Great Western finally com-
menced its tender offer on September 19, 1977. The target, seeing
the handwriting on the wall, eventually withdrew its opposition to
the offer, and Great Western United succeeded in buying over
22% of Sunshine's shares-all the shares it sought to buy-in the
tender offer.
e. The Impact of Great Western United on Offeror
Strategy. On August 10, 1978, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the de-
cision of the district court for much the same reasons that underlie
Judge Hill's decision.3' If the case is taken to the Supreme Court, I
believe it should be affirmed because state statutes like that of
Idaho deter offers, burden commerce, and, being blatantly pro-
target management, are inconsistent with the balance between of-
28. 439 F. Supp. at 428-29.
29. Id. at 437.
30. Id. at 438-40.
31. Great W. United Corp. v. McEldowney, No. 77-2809 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 1978).
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feror and target company that Congress sought in the Williams
Act.
As a result of the Great Western decision, state securities ad-
ministrators may be expected to avoid lengthy jurisdictional dis-
putes by being more circumspect in asserting jurisdiction over
offers for shares of corporations not incorporated in their states.
Moreover, there appears to be some evidence that state securities
administrators will coordinate their reviews of tender offers, with
one state taking the lead and other states deferring to the resolu-
tion of issues litigated in the lead state.32 Until the dust finally
settles, an offeror must still make a careful analysis, based on the
state of incorporation and available material concerning locations
of plants and operations, to determine which statutes may be ap-
plicable. If the target company has plants, for example, in New
York and New Jersey, an offeror will have an unpleasant choice.
If the offeror ignores the New York and New Jersey statutes, it
may provoke an order staying the offer. Such an order would re-
main in effect until the constitutionality of the application of the
statute can be determined. The offeror may also risk criminal
sanctions. On the other hand, compliance with the state statute
entails an automatic delay while the state officials determine
whether to hold a hearing and then (perhaps) hold a hearing. A
middle course would be to comply with each arguably applicable
state statute while contending its application would be unconstitu-
tional and to sue the appropriate state officials in federal court if
they appear likely to cause undue delay. Such an approach can
result in reasonably prompt processing by state officials. There is
no perfect solution to the dilemma; each tender offer will call for
judgment based on contacts with the state, the nature of the state
statute, and the attitude of the state officials.33
32. This is precisely what occurred in the United Technologies offer for Babcock &
Wilcox. The state securities officials in New Jersey and Arkansas followed the lead of the
Ohio Division of Securities, which recommended that the offer proceed on the condition
that it remain open for a longer period of time.
33. One interesting approach to a broad-reaching state statute is reflected in the Great
Western tender offer for Sunshine. The Arkansas statute applies not only to offers for
shares of corporations organized or having their principal office in Arkansas but also to
offers for shares of corporations that have more than 35 equity security holders residing in
Arkansas. ARK. STAT. ANN. § l(5)(c) (1977). The Great Western offer states that Great
Western "does not believe that the Arkansas statute constitutionally applies" to Great
Western's offer, that Great Western is not making the offer to, nor will it accept tenders
from, Arkansas stockholders, and that Great Western has not filed the registration state-
ment called for by the Arkansas statute.
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What will be the effect of Great Western on the balance of
power in a tender offer? Martin Lipton, a veteran of many tender
offer fights, has predicted that an affirmance of Great Western
"will mean the return of the Saturday Night Special" 3 4 -that is, a
blitz offer, made without warning and scheduled to expire a bare
seven or ten days later.
Several factors make me hesitant to embrace such a prediction.
First, for good-sized offers, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act36 will al-
most certainly ensure that such offers remain open for at least ten
days. Second, the SEC may seek to require an offer to be open at
least fifteen business days, under the proposed tender offer rules.37
Third, it is uncertain whether the court's approach in Great
Western would invalidate all state takeover laws. Consider, for
example, the limited jurisdiction of the Delaware statute, 38 apply-
ing only to offers for Delaware corporations. Substantively, this
statute merely requires twenty days' notice before the offer be-
comes effective, a 20-day withdrawal period for tendering share-
holders, and modest disclosures. It does not authorize
administrative hearings and applies even-handedly whether or not
the offer has been blessed by target company management. While
the statute could be considered inconsistent with the Williams Act
in mandating advance warning and a more lengthy withdrawal
period, states traditionally have had broad powers in regulating
both relations among shareholders and control changes in corpo-
rations organized under their laws. 39 Moreover, the relative innoc-
uousness of the Delaware restrictions might persuade an offeror to
comply with the statute rather than challenge its constitutionality.
2. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
Until recently no law required an offeror to give advance no-
tice to the antitrust enforcement agencies before making a tender
34. N.Y.L.J. Sept. 8, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
35. The William Act does not directly prescribe any minimum period for a tender
offer. A seven day minimum is implicit, however, in the requirement that depositing share-
holders be free to withdraw their shares during the first seven days of an offer. Exchange
Act §14(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1976). In addition, a 10-day requirement is implied if
an offer is for less than all shares, since the maker of such an offer is required to take up
pro rata all shares deposited during the first 10 days of the offer. Id. § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. §
78n(d)(6) (1976).
36. See section 2 infra.
37. See section 3 infra.
38. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1977).
39. See Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legislation: The
Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 722, 740-51 (1970).
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offer. In the past the only requirement has been that an offeror file
a special report with the Federal Trade Commission within ten
days after making a tender offer for 10% or more of the target's
stock if the target company has sales or assets of $10 million or
more and combined sales or assets of the two companies total
$250 million or more.'
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,
effective February 27, 1977, requires that an offeror provide ad-
vance notification to both the Federal Trade Commission and the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, in the case of any
acquisition of at least 15% of the Voting securities of a company, if
one of the companies has total assets or annual net sales of $100
million or more and the other has total assets or annual net sales
of $10 million or more.41 In the case of a cash tender offer, the Act
prescribes a waiting period of fifteen days, following notification
to the government agencies, before shares can be acquired.42 Both
antitrust enforcement agencies have the power to waive the wait-
ing period altogether.43 In addition, during the fifteen day waiting
period, either agency may request that additional material be sub-
mitted and extend the waiting period ten days.44
Although the Act went into effect on February 27, 1977, final
rules were not promulgated until July 1978 4 and will apply only
to tender offers communicated after September 15, 1978.46
It is too early to predict with any confidence how the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act will affect tender offers. The Act will not delay
the commencement of offers since it requires a waiting period
prior to the acquisition of shares, as opposed to before the making
of an offer. It will, however, produce delays in the completion of
some offers.
Additionally, the antitrust strategy of offerors and targets will
shift somewhat. An offeror will undoubtedly prepare as much ma-
terial as possible in advance of the commencement of an of-
fer-perhaps in the nature of a full-fledged memorandum of facts
and law-in an effort to convince the government agencies that
there is no antitrust problem, that adequate information has been
40. Resolution of Federal Trade Commission, reprintedin 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
4540 (Aug. 15, 1974).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(1976).
42. Id. § 18a(b)(1)(B).
43. Id. § 18a(b)(2).
44. Id. § 18a(e)(1) & (2).
45. 43 Fed. Reg. 28,045 (1978).
46. Id. at 33,450.
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submitted, and that the waiting period should be waived (or at
least not extended).
While the Act gives a target company an increased opportu-
nity to use its best efforts to persuade the appropriate agency to
intervene and delay or block an offer on antitrust grounds, it does
not necessarily represent a dramatic shift of power in favor of the
target company. Since the Act will increase the opportunity for
agency participation in the antitrust aspects of takeovers, it may
be expected that if the agencies have declined to take any action
regarding the proposed acquisition, courts-some of which al-
ready view an antitrust complaint by a target company as "a form
of gamesmanship from which the processes of a busy Court
should not suffer" 47 -may be less inclined to grant preliminary
injunctions at the behest of a target company. The Act may create
a risk for target companies bringing private antitrust actions that
the court will be more inclined to find for the defendant offeror
than would a court in a government suit, and that such a finding
will make it less likely that a government suit, if brought, will
block the takeover. A prime example of this scenario occurred in
the United Technologies offer for Babcock & Wilcox. The Akron
judge who denied a preliminary injunction on antitrust grounds in
a suit brought by the target company was not swayed to enjoin the
proposed takeover when the Department of Justice later came
before it as the plaintiff. Despite the risks, there remain two strong
reasons a target company may be expected to continue to bring
antitrust actions against offerors. First, the suit will permit the tar-
get company to obtain quick discovery of facts concerning the in-
dustry and the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition, which
can be fed to the government agencies in an effort to induce them
to intervene. Second, the target company may be able to pre-
vail-or at least to buy time-even if the government does not
institute an action.4"
47. GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 329 F. Supp. 823, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See also
Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 870 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 883 (1974).
48. At least three tender offers in the past two years have died as a result of prelimi-
nary injunctions issued on antitrust grounds. Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas Corp., 423 F.
Supp. 199 (D. Md.), afft 546 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1976); Boyertown Burial Casket Co. v.
Amedco, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Chemetron Corp. v. Crane Co., No. 77-
2800 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 1977), summarized inANTrrIRusT & TRADE RaG. REp. (BNA) No.
833, at A-5 (Oct. 6, 1977).
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3. Amendments to the SEC's Tender Offer Rules
On August 2, 1976, the SEC proposed extensive amendments
to the rules and schedules relating to tender offers promulgated
under the Exchange Act.49 According to the SEC, the principal
reasons for the amendments were to clarify the disclosure require-
ments relating to tender offers and to insure that investors had an
adequate opportunity to consider communications from the of-
feror as well as from the target in deciding whether to sell, tender,
or hold their shares.5 0 If adopted as proposed, the amendments
would establish a minimum number of days tender offers would
have to be held open and would require a target company to turn
over its stockholder list to an offeror. As of the date of this article,
only one part of the proposed amendments--those amending the
schedule an offeror must file with the SEC-has been adopted."1
a. The New Tender Offer Schedule. The new tender offer
schedule, Schedule 14D-1, calls for more extensive disclosure by
an offeror than has heretofore been required.
Some of the additional disclosure requirements, although new,
either are not particularly burdensome or call for information of-
ferors have frequently volunteered in tender offers, including:
i. information as to sales prices for target company shares for
each quarterly period during the past two years; 52
ii. information as to any transaction within the past three full
fiscal years between the offeror and the target company or its cor-
porate affiliates, if the transaction involves an amount equal to or
greater than 1% of the target's consolidated revenues; 53
iii. a description of contacts and negotiations with the target
company concerning an acquisition, merger, or election of direc-
tors in the past three full fiscal years of the target company;54 and
iv. any plan or proposal to change the target company's direc-
tors or management.55
Much more troublesome is the new schedule's ambiguous re-
quirement for financial information concerning the offeror, which
appears in Item 9.56 Item 9 would require disclosure in an of-
49. 41 Fed. Reg. 33,004 (1976).
50. Id.
51. 42 Id. 38,341 (1977).
52. Schedule 14D-1, Item l(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978).
53. Schedule 14D-1, Item 3(a), id.
54. Schedule 14D-1, Item 3(b), id.
55. Schedule 14D-1, Item 5(c), Id.
56. Schedule 14D-l, Item 9, id.
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feror's SEC filing of "adequate financial information" concerning
the offer if the offeror's financial condition "is material to a deci-
sion by a security holder of the subject [target] company whether
to sell, tender or hold securities being sought in the tender offer."
The SEC's release indicates that whether disclosure of financial
information is material depends on all the facts and circum-
stances, including but not limited to, the amount of securities 6 e-
ing sought, the offeror's plans with respect to the target, the
offeror's ability to pay for tendered shares, and its ability to repay
any loans in connection with the offer or otherwise.57
The case law under section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, the gen-
eral antifraud provision relating to tender offers, provides some
guidelines as to when financial information may be material and
thus may trigger the required disclosure in Schedule 14D-1. There
is authority for the proposition that some financial information
about an offeror may be necessary if the offer is for less than all
the shares of the target company and the possibility of a post-
tender offer merger exists. This disclosure requirement is appar-
ently premised on the theory that in such an offer the target com-
pany's shareholders become shareholders of the offeror after the
merger; consequently, they have a legitimate interest in the of-
feror's financial status.58 On the other hand, some cases have held
that financial information about the offeror is not material where
the offer is one for all the stock of the corporation and there are
no plans for a post-offer merger which would require an evalua-
tion by the target shareholders of the offeror's shares.59
In the absence of any real guidance from the Commission, I
would expect to see offerors including (typically by incorporation
by reference) financial information about themselves in their
Schedules 14D-1 and briefly summarizing such financial infor-
mation in the tender offers.60
57. Id.
58. Humana Inc. v. American Medicorp Inc., 445 F. Supp. 613, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 939, 948-50 (S.D.N.Y.), alf'd in part
and rev'd in part, 488 F.2d 207, 214-15 (2d Cir. 1973).
59. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579, 601 & n.60 (W.D. Pa.
1975); Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F. Supp. 532, 546-48 (D. Del. 1975).
60. Rule 14d-l(c)(4) requires a tender offer to include "the information required by
Item... 9... of Schedule 14D-1... or a fair and adequate summary thereof." 42 Fed.
Reg. 38,347 (1977). Instruction 2 to rule 14d-1(c) states that summary financial information
equivalent to that required under Guide 59 of the Guides of Preparation and Filing Regis-
tration Statements would normally be sufficient. Id.
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What is "adequate financial information"? To be within the
"safe harbor" afforded on this question by Instruction 1 to Item
9,61 a domestic offeror will need to include financial statements
prepared in accordance with Form 10 under the Exchange Act.62
A foreign offeror would need to include financial statements com-
plying with Form 20,63 under which any material variations in ac-
counting principles and practices from those generally accepted in
the United States must be disclosed. To the extent practicable, the
effect of each such variation must also be given.64 Such a require-
ment seems to impose an unnecessary burden on a foreign offeror
offering cash for all of a target company's shares and may con-
ceivably deter some foreign offerors who have never prepared fi-
nancial statements complying with Form 20 from making tender
offers.
Also troubling are new Item 10, calling for disclosure of ar-
rangements between the offeror (or its officers, directors, control-
ling persons, or subsidiaries) and the target company (or its
officers, directors, controlling persons, or subsidiaries); applicable
regulatory requirements that must be complied with in connection
with the offer; the applicability of antitrust laws; the applicability
of the margin rules; any material, pending legal proceedings relat-
ing to the offer; and "such additional material information, if any,
as may be necessary to make the required statements, in light of
the circumstances under which they are made, not materially mis-
leading." 65 Disclosure of all this information is required only "if
material to a decision by a security holder whether to sell, tender
or hold securities being sought in the tender offer." Certainly one
of the more difficult tasks of the offeror's counsel will be to deter-
mine just when this particular information is "material. '66 Absent
further guidance from the SEC, offerors will have to rely on the
case law under section 14(e) of the Exchange Act. Several of these
cases suggest some of the circumstances under which disclosures
as to the items mentioned in new Item 10 might be required. As an
example, some courts have held that antitrust questions should be
61. 42 Fed. Reg. 38,349 (1977).
62. Form 10 is the general form for registration of securities pursuant to § 12(b) or
§ 12(g) of the Exchange Act. 17 C.F.R. § 249.210 (1977).
63. Form 20 is the general form for registration under the Exchange Act for a foreign
private issuer. 17 C.F.R. § 249.220 (1977).
64. Instruction 1 to Form 20. Id.
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978).
66. Id.
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disclosed if the offer involved serious antitrust problems,67 but not
otherwise.6 8 New Item 10 may mean that offerors will find it pru-
dent to include disclosures as to the matters enumerated in the
Item, even if such disclosures would not be required under the
section 14(e) case law and even if the information is immaterial to
target company shareholders.
It is safe to predict that tender offer litigation will continue to
involve the question whether the offeror should have disclosed
matters not specifically called for by Schedule 14D-1 (or its pred-
ecessor Schedule 13D). 69
Despite the Supreme Court's holding in Pper v. Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc. 70 that a defeated offeror does not have standing to
sue for damages under section 14(e), I believe that courts will con-
tinue to imply private rights of action for injunctive relief against
tender offers involving inadequate disclosure. While the Supreme
Court in Pper left open the question of standing to sue for injunc-
tive relief,7 the long line of cases holding that the public interest
is served if target companies can seek to protect their shareholders
by bringing tender offer disclosure questions before the courts72
will probably survive Poer.73
67. See, e.g., Gulf& W. Indus., Inc. v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 697
(2d Cir. 1973).
68. See, e.g., Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 249, 268
(S.D.N.Y.), of'd in part and rev'd in part, 498 F.2d 851, 871 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
883 (1974).
69. One case holding that more may have to be disclosed under § 14(e) than is specifi-
cally called for by Schedule 13D is Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 362 F. Supp.
939, 948-50 (S.D.N.Y.), affid in part and rev'd in part, 488 F.2d 207, 214-15 (2d Cir. 1973).
Indeed, the SEC has broadened the scope of litigable disclosure topics. The Commission
has indicated that Item 10(f) calls for disclosure of litigation not relating to the offer but
"which may reflect on the integrity of the bidder." This reading is evidently intended to
require disclosure of suits involving questionable payments by the offeror. In addition, the
SEC has stated that Item 2(e) of the Schedule requires disclosure of criminal convictions of
any officers of the offeror even prior to the 5-year cut-off if during the 5-year period the
officer had been on probation or serving a sentence. 42 Fed. Reg. 38,348 (1977).
70. 430 U.S. 1, 42 & n.28 (1977).
71. Id. at 47 & n.33.
72. See, e.g, Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assoc,, 483 F.2d 247, 250-51 (2d
Cir. 1973); H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421, 424 (lst Cir. 1973); Elec-
tronic Speciality Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 946 (2d Cir. 1969);
accord, Note, Towards the Development of an Implied Right fAction Under Rule 14A-8 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 27 CAse W. REs. L. REv. 1010 (1977).
73. Cf., e.g, Humana Inc. v. American Medicorp Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,298 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 1978) (despite Pper, an offeror has
standing under § 14(e) to seek injunctive relief against the maker of a competing tender
offer). As recently noted, target company suits for injunctive relief, "although tending to
some extent to inhibit the making of tender offers, would appear to serve the interests of
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b. Access to the Target Company Shareholder List. The
SEC has proposed, but has not yet adopted, a rule which would
make it a violation of section 14(e) for a target company to fail to
furnish an offeror, within two days of receipt of the written tender
offer, the most recent list of the target company's stockholders.74
The proposed rule would require the bidder to undertake to use
such lists exclusively in connection with the offer and to mail
tender offer materials to each stockholder of record.
The SEC staff has indicated that it intends to continue to press
for adoption of the rule or one that would require the target to
turn over its stockholder list to the offeror or mail the offer to
stockholders at the offeror's expense." Such a rule would not, as a
practical matter, make it easier for an offeror to succeed. Under
present practice, if the offeror does not have a copy of the target
company's shareholder list, the offeror publishes the offer in
newspapers and distributes copies of the offer to broker-dealers.
As a result, the only shareholders unlikely to hear of an offer
before it is over are small, unsophisticated shareholders whose
holdings are unknown to broker-dealers.
There is considerable doubt concerning the SEC's power to re-
quire the furnishing of a shareholder list. Traditionally, access to a
shareholder list has been viewed as a matter of state corporate
law.76 As the statutory basis for the shareholder list rules, the SEC
appears to invoke section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, which pro-
hibits "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative" acts or practices in
shareholders in receiving more accurate or complete information about the offer." Mishkin
& Nathan, Tender Offers Continue to Surge as New Laws and Cases Alter Tactics, N.Y.L.J.,
Dec. 19, 1977, at 30, col. 2.
74. Proposed rule 14e-1, introduced in Exchange Act Release No. 12,676 (Aug. 2,
1976), 41 Fed. Reg. 33,004 (1976). The Commission based its decision to propose 14e-1 on
the information obtained both through its Tender Offer Hearings and its general experi-
ence. The Commission believes 14e-1 is preferable to requiring the target to mail the of-
feror's materials because 14e- would prevent potential abuses by the subject company
such as delaying the mailing of the materials. Furthermore, 14e-1 would provide the bid-
der with the opportunity to communicate directly with security holders on an equal basis
with the subject company, and it should facilitate communication of the tender offer to the
greatest number of record holders and beneficial owners of the security. Id.
75. Remarks of Ruth D. Appleton, Director of the Office of Tender Offers, Acquisi-
tions and Small Issuers, of the SEC, at the PLI's Ninth Annual Institute of Securities Regu-
lation (Nov. 10, 1977). Mrs. Appleton has indicated that the shareholder list proposal
would be released for comment, not adopted as a final rule.
76. See, ag., Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Aztec Oil & Gas Co., 406 F. Supp. 910, 914
(N.D. Tex. 1976); A&K R.R. Materials, Inc. v. Green Bay & W.R.R. [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,266 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Applied Digital Data Sys. Inc.
v. Milgo Elec. Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,861
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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connection with a tender offer. But one must question whether it
is "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative" for a target company to
withhold its shareholder list from an offeror. There is some case
law utilizing section 14(e) as support for an order requiring a tar-
get company to turn over a list if the target itself has been using
the list to communicate with stockholders or has made the list
available to a competing bidder.77 The proposed rule, however,
would require the target company to furnish a list, even if the tar-
get has not been using the list to communicate with stockholders
concerning the offer. Moreover, the cases requiring targets to turn
over their shareholder lists antedated the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green.78 Santa Fe held that
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and, by implication, other an-
tifraud provisions such as section 14(e) are not concerned with un-
fairness unless accompanied by misstatements or less than full
disclosure. As the cases which demanded turnover of a share-
holder list did not involve falsehoods or nondisclosures, their con-
tinued viability is doubtful.
c. Duration ofthe Offer. Two of the SEC's proposed tender
offer rules, which the SEC staff apparently still favors, would, as
the provisions of many state takeover statutes do, prevent brief
"blitz" offers. Proposed rule 14e-2 79 would make it a fraudulent
or deceptive act or practice for a bidder to make a tender offer
which does not remain open for at least fifteen business days from
the date the offer commences. Proposed rule 14d-5 0 would give a
shareholder the right to withdraw any shares deposited pursuant
to a tender offer until the expiration of the tenth business day after
the offeror's formal offer and related transmittal letters are pub-
lished.
Section 14(d)(5) of the Act gives the SEC the authority to pre-
scribe periods within which shareholders may withdraw deposited
securities.8 ' It may be questioned, particularly in light of the deci-
77. Applied Digital Data Sys. Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 95,861 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Aztec Oil &
Gas Co., 406 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Tex. 1976); ef. A&K R.R. Materials v. Green Bay &
W.R.R., Inc. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 96,266 (E.D. Wis.
1977) (holding that § 14(e) did not require a target company to furnish its shareholder list
to an offeror, when the target had commented on the offer in the newspaper, not in a
mailing to shareholders).
78. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
79. 41 Fed. Reg. 33,004 (1976).
80. Id.
81. Section 14(d)(5) of the Exchange Act provides:
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sion in Santa Fe, whether the SEC has power under section 14(e)
of the Exchange Act to require an offer to be open for a specified
period. Is it really "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative" for an
offer to be open for less than fifteen business days?8 2
d. Mechanics of Making a Tender Offer. The Exchange Act
does not specify the type or extent of publication of an offer which
must be undertaken by an offeror without access to a target com-
pany shareholder list.8 3 In light of this uncertainty, many bidders
have printed the full text of the offer and the letter of transmit-
tal-sometimes more than three printed pages-in the national
edition of the Wall Street Journal, at a cost of close to $100,000.
Proposed rule 14d-314 is an attempt to dispel the uncertainty
surrounding this area and to reduce the offeror's publication costs.
Under the proposed rule, which may be adopted within the next
few months, an offer would be deemed to have been "published or
sent or given to security holders," within the meaning of section
14(d)(1) of the Exchange Act, if the offeror follows any one of
three courses of action: (1) mailing the offer to all stockholders of
record; (2) publishing the full offer in a newspaper (which, "de-
pending on the facts and circumstances involved," may have to be
Securities deposited pursuant to a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders
may be withdrawn by or on behalf of the depositor at any time until the expira-
tion of seven days after the time definitive copies of the offer or request or invita-
tion are first published or sent or given to security holders, and at any time after
sixty days from the date of the original tender offer or request or invitation, ex-
cept as the Commission may otherwise prescribe by rules, regulations, or order as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)(1976).
82. In the release announcing the proposed rule, the Commission argued that the rule
would alleviate undue pressure on shareholders without unduly hindering the bidder mak-
ing a tender offer. Exchange Act Release No. 12,676, 41 Fed. Reg. 33004 (Aug. 2, 1976).
The Commission's theory appears to be that a tender offer should be kept open 15 business
days in order to reduce pressure on investors and thereby decrease the possibility of their
being victimized by "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative" practices.
83. The Act merely requires filing with the SEC at the time copies of the offer "are
first published or sent or given to security holders .. " Exchange Act § 14(d)(1), 15
U.S.C. § 78n (d)(1)(1976); see Letter from Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, to Advanced Sys., Inc.,
(Nov. 15, 1973), quotedin [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 79,653 (SEC
would not take enforcement action against an offeror which both announced the offer to
nationwide press services and ran the full offer as an advertisement in the regional edition
of the Wall Street Journal for the region in which most of the shareholders were located).
But see Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 406 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Mo.
1975) (not sufficient publication to announce a 10-day offer by means of a tombstone sum-
mary and mail the full offer to holders shown on a year-old list).
84. 41 Fed. Reg. 33,004 (1976). The SEC's Division of Corporate Finance has recently
warned that until proposed rule 14d-3 is adopted, summary publication of a tender offer is
unauthorized. Advance Announcement, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) No. 751, at 2 (May 18,
1978).
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a newspaper of national circulation); or (3) publishing a brief
summary of the offer, indicating when and where full copies of
the tender offer materials can be obtained.
e. Post-tender Offer Purchases. Proposed rule 14d-6 s1
would integrate with the tender offer certain purchases of securi-
ties made after the offer. Specifically, any purchases of securities
which are, or which are convertible into, securities of the same
class sought in the tender offer would be integrated with the
tender offer if the purchases are made within forty business days
after termination of the tender offer. The practical effect of the
proposed rule would be to bar post-offer purchases because of the
impossibility of complying with certain tender offer requirements,
such as the right of withdrawal.
The Commission's staff is said to be internally divided as to
the desirability of this proposed rule. Perhaps this is because the
rule would prohibit, for no apparent reason, an offeror from buy-
ing shares in the open market at the tender offer price. The staff
has been considering an alternative formulation under which the
offeror, in the immediate post-offer period, would be required to
pay to all sellers the highest price paid by the offeror to any seller
but would not be required to comply with the withdrawal and pro
rata acceptance provisions of the Williams Act. 6
4. Amendments to Section 13 of the Exchange Act
The Domestic and Foreign Investment Improved Disclosure
Act of 1977 (the "Ownership Disclosure Act"), signed into law on
December 20, 1977, amended in three principal respects the Ex-
change Act requirements addressing disclosure of beneficial own-
ership.87 First, the Ownership Disclosure Act amended section
13(d) by authorizing the SEC to require additional disclosure of
information, such as the citizenship of the offeror and its associ-
ates, by one who acquires more than 5% of a public company.
Second, the Act adds a new section 13(g), which makes ownership
of more than 5%, by any person, a reportable event. Such owner-
ship must be reported even if the shares were acquired so
slowly-less than 2% in any twelve-month period-that reporting
would not be required under section 13(d).18
85. 41 Fed. Reg. 33,004 (1976).
86. Exchange Act §§ 14(d)(5)-14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)(5)-78n(d)(6)(1976).
87. Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 201-204, 91 Stat. 1498 (1977) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(d), (g), (h), 78.(o) (amending Exchange Act § 13 (g), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(1976)).
88. Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act does not apply to any acquisition which, to-
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The third amendment, section 13(h), directs the SEC to report
to Congress concerning the desirability and the feasibility of low-
ering the reporting threshold from 5% to some lesser percentage.
There appears to be a real possibility that the threshold will be
lowered since an earlier version of the Act would have lowered the
threshold to 1/2 of %.89
The changes instituted by the Ownership Disclosure Act will
prevent a patient prospective offeror from gradually accumulating
more than 5% of the target's stock without prompt disclosure.
The changes also suggest that a prospective offeror may soon be
prevented from buying even less than 5% of the target's shares
without public disclosure of the purchases.
5. Going-Private Developments
One major distinction between an acquisition by tender offer
and an acquisition by merger or sale of assets is that the tender
offer almost never acquires 100% of the stock of a publicly held
target company in a tender offer transaction.
Inevitably, there are shareholders who cannot be found or who
refuse to sell. Even in the context of a friendly tender offer, the
offeror rarely acquires more than 95% of the target company's
stock, even after numerous extensions of the expiration date of the
offer. As a result, the offeror must either live with or act to elimi-
nate a minority interest in the target company.
Living with a minority interest can be difficult. If there are a
sufficient number of minority shareholders, the target company
will continue to be a reporting company, subject to both the proxy
rules and the periodic reporting requirements.9" There are also
likely to be many recurring conflicts of interest between the ma-
jority shareholder and the minority shareholders concerning such
matters as dividends payable by the target company, loans from
the target to the offeror parent, allocation of tax advantages and
gether with all other acquisitions by the same person of securities of the same class during
the preceding twelve months, does not exceed 2% of the class. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(6)(B)
(1976).
89. S. REP. No. 953, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 203 (1976). This version would have re-
quired disclosure by 2% holders, with the threshold dropping in steps to 1% and then to 1/2
of 1%.
90. Issuers registered under § 12(b) or § 12(g) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 781(b)(g) (1976), continue to be subject to the proxy rules under § 14(a), Id. § 78n(a)
(1976), and to the reporting requirements of§ 13(a), id. § 78m(a) (1976), until such time as
the security ceases to be traded on a national securities exchange and its total number of
record shareholders drops below 300.
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costs between the two companies, and other transactions between
the two companies. Such conflicts of interest can be a prolific
source of litigation.91
Eliminating the minority interest has become increasingly dif-
ficult in recent years and promises to become even more so. In a
stock merger, minority shareholders may be eliminated and enjoy
dissenter rights, but some state courts have held that minority
shareholders cannot be eliminated in a cash merger transaction
unless a valid business purpose for the transaction can be demon-
strated.92 In the fall of 1977 the Supreme Court of Delaware first
held that a cash merger for the sole purpose of eliminating the
minority interest was an abuse of corporate law; the court did not
explain what constituted a proper business purpose. 93 A subse-
quent decision by the same court held that while a business pur-
pose to benefit the majority shareholder would not necessarily
invalidate a going-private transaction, any such transaction would
be carefully scrutinized to make sure it was entirely fair to minor-
ity shareholders. 94 In a third going-private case, the Delaware
Supreme Court applied a rigorous test-apparently stricter than a
federal materiality standard-in determining what information a
majority shareholder must disclose in a going-private tender offer
transaction.95 Finally, on the federal level in November 1977, the
SEC released for comment proposed rules which would not only
codify disclosure requirements relating to going-private transac-
tions but would also require that such transactions be fair to mi-
nority shareholders.96
There is serious doubt whether the SEC has the power to im-
pose a federal fairness requirement in going-private transactions.
The statute relied upon by the SEC, section 13(e) of the Exchange
Act, merely authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules to define and
to prevent "fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading" acts and prac-
tices in connection with corporate repurchases of their own
91. See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr.
592 (1969) (conflict of interest with respect to opportunity for increasing marketability of
shares); Sinclair Oil Co. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971) (conflict of interest
as to dividends).
92. See Bryan v. Block & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
844 (1974).
93. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977).
94. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus. Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977).
95. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977).
96. Proposed rule 13e-3, 42 Fed. Reg. 60,090 (1977).
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stock.97 The Supreme Court in Santa Fe held that a comparable
antifraud statute, section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, did not pro-
scribe a going-private transaction that was allegedly unfair to
minority shareholders but did not involve misstatements or omis-
sions of material facts.98 In light of the Santa Fe decision, it is
difficult to see how an antifraud statute can be read to impose a
general fairness requirement in going-private transactions.
These recent state and federal developments in going-private
transactions will have an impact on tender offers. The increased
regulation of going-private transactions must be taken into ac-
count by offerors, who must consider how difficult it will be to
eliminate the minority interest remaining even after a successful
tender offer.
While the increased regulation of going-private transactions is
unlikely to deter many offerors willing to undertake the problems
of a contested offer, at least one effect is predictable if the federal
rules are adopted as proposed. The proposed rules apply to certain
transactions involving an offeror who is an "affiliate" of the is-
suer, and provide that an offeror who is not an affiliate of an is-
suer at the time the offeror starts a tender offer for the issuer's
stock will not be deemed an affiliate "prior to the stated termina-
tion of such tender offer and any extensions thereof."99 As a re-
sult, offerors are likely to hold their tender offers open for a long
time in order to purchase as many shares as possible in the prelim-
inary transaction that is not subject to the federal going-private
rules. Moreover, if the initial offer leaves so few minority share-
holders'that the target's shares can be delisted and withdrawn
from registration under section 12 of the Exchange Act, a subse-
quent going-private transaction would be subject to the proposed
federal disclosure requirements but would avoid the proposed fed-
eral fairness standard."°
6. The Partial Renaissance of the Proxy Fight
The conventional wisdom in recent years has been that the
tender offer has replaced the proxy fight as the means of obtaining
97. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1976).
98. 430 U.S. 462, 471-77 (1977).
99. Proposed rule 13e-3(a)(1), 42 Fed. Reg. 60,090 (1977).
100. The proposed fairness rule, 13e-3(b), id., applies only to issuers of securities regis-
tered pursuant to § 12 of the Exchange Act, while the proposed disclosure rule, 13e-3(e),
id., applies to issuers subject to § 15(d) of the Exchange Act, whether or not the securities
of the issuer are registered on a national securities exchange. Id
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corporate control. This situation was attributed to the difficulty of
ousting an incumbent management (unless it was demonstrably
incompetent and the insurgents had a large stock position), the
significant amount of money and time consumed by a proxy fight,
and the impossibility of recouping proxy fight costs if the insur-
gents failed to take control.
The past year has seen a partial renaissance of the proxy fight
in certain circumstances. This renaissance is more in response to
market conditions than to regulatory developments. Proxy con-
tests have begun to be worthy of consideration in situations where
a target company's shares are trading at substantially less than as-
set value and the insurgents promise to the shareholders a way of
realizing on the discount between market price and asset value.
The renaissance began with the closed-end investment compa-
nies. By definition, the shares of such funds (unlike the shares of
open-end funds) are not redeemable at asset value.10' While
shares of closed-end funds have sometimes traded at a premium
over asset value, in recent years such shares have generally sold at
substantial discounts, ranging from 15% to as much as 40% or
more. In recent months, market professionals have bought size-
able holdings of certain closed-end companies and have proposed
shareholder resolutions requesting the directors to take the steps
necessary to provide that the companies become open-end funds.
Such shareholder proposals have typically been approved in the
face of strong management opposition.10 2 The ultimate result will
be that the market professional shareholders (and the other share-
holders) can make a profit by reason of the elimination of the
discount.
The technique is even now being applied to a noninvestment
company, Kennecott Copper Corporation. Kennecott has for
some time been rich in cash, particularly after its sale of Peabody
Coal Company for close to $1 billion. In an attempt to make itself
less vulnerable to possible takeover, Kennecott bought The Car-
borundum Company for $567 million in 1977. Curtiss-Wright
Corporation bought some 3,287,000 Kennecott shares in the open
market at an average cost of $23.42 and solicited support for an
entirely new slate of directors committed to selling Carborundum
101. Investment Company Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5 (1970).
102. Such proposals were approved over management opposition by the shareholders
of American Utility Shares in November 1977, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1977, at 30, col. 1, and
by the shareholders of National Aviation Corp. in March 1977, id., April 10, 1978, at 5, col.
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and distributing a dividend of $20 per share to all Kennecott
shareholders or to making a tender offer to buy back 50% of Ken-
necott's stock at $40 per share.103 Curtiss-Wright, which says it
would tender half its Kennecott holdings, stands to realize some
$65 million on the transaction, less proxy costs estimated at not
less than $350,000.1° Since Curtiss-Wright owns just less than
10% of Kennecott's stock, there would be no need to disgorge
profits under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, even if
the transaction were to occur in the near future.
The traditional proxy fight has been difficult to win because
shareholders are reluctant to vote against management. But the
experience of the closed-end investment companies indicates that
shareholders will vote against management when it is demonstra-
bly in their immediate economic self-interest. The Kennecott ex-
perience indicates that short-run economic self-interest can, under
the right circumstances, overcome shareholder reluctance to re-
place an incumbent board. Despite an adverse lower court deci-
sion 105 on the eve of the Kennecott annual meeting, Curtiss-
Wright's nominees received over 11 million votes-not enough to
win but not far short of the 12.6 million votes received by Kenne-
cott's nominees. 0 6 It is conceivable that similar proxy contests
may be made for other companies with asset values which are not
reflected in the market price of their stock or which could be con-
verted to cash and distributed to shareholders. Consider the
mighty IBM, which on December 31, 1977, had cash and marketa-
ble securities of $5.4 billion, or about $37 per share, out of total
net assets of $12.7 billion.107 IBM's investment income in 1977
came to only $475 million-less than 10% of its $5 billion earnings
before taxes. IBM stock traded as low as $249 in the fourth quar-
ter of 1977. Perhaps one could buy a block of IBM at around $250
and propose a slate of directors committed to a special dividend of
$35 per share-more than three times the 1977 dividend and a
103. Proxy statement of Curtiss-Wright Corporation (April 4, 1978).
104. Id.
105. The trial court held that Curtiss-Wright had violated the proxy rules and that its
acquisition of control of Kennecott would violate the antitrust laws. Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., [Current] FED. SEc. L. REp. (CCH) 96,408 (S.D.N.Y. May
1, 1978).
106. Wall St. J., June 21, 1978, at 12, col. 1. Curtiss-Wright may renew its proxy solici-
tation efforts if the Second Circuit reverses the trial court's decision, which (according to
Curtiss-Wright) caused substantial vote-switching in favor of Kennecott's management just
before the meeting. Id.
107. IBM, 1977 Annual Report to Shareholders.
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14% return on a $250 purchase price. The special dividend might
cause no more than a 10% impairment in IBM's earning
power-but I am merely speculating.
While the partial renaissance of the proxy contest is largely in
response to market conditions, it also reflects changes in the regu-
latory context. The conventional wisdom was that proxy contests
took longer and cost more than tender offers. With the prolifera-
tion of state takeover statutes and court contests in tender offers,
this may no longer be true. To be sure, Curtiss-Wright has esti-
mated the cost of its solicitation to be at least $350,000, but many
contested tender offers cost the offeror well over $1 million in le-
gal fees, not to mention huge dealer-manager and soliciting dealer
fees. Moreover, proxy contests are typically subject only to the
federal proxy rules; the state takeover laws by their terms apply to
tender offers, not to proxy solicitations. This means an insurgent
in a proxy contest may be fighting merely a two-front war before
the SEC and in the federal district court, not a war before a
number of state securities commissions as well as in the federal
court.10 8 Proxy contests may now be quicker than some tender of-
fers. If Curtiss-Wright had been successful in electing its nominees
at the Kennecott annual meeting, the Curtiss-Wright fight for
Kennecott might have lasted only two months-from mid-March
to mid-May-a twinkling of an eye compared to the five-month
United Technologies siege for Babcock & Wilcox.
7. Checklist for an Offeror
The preceding discussion has highlighted the effects of numer-
ous regulatory changes in tender offer legislation and has briefly
examined the proxy contest as an alternative method of acquiring
corporate control. All of these developments may affect an of-
feror's initial determination as to whether to proceed with a tender
offer. In addition, the regulatory changes may significantly affect
the role of an offeror in a tender offer. It may be useful in sum-
mary to consider how such changes are integrated into the many
concerns an offeror's counsel must address once the decision to
launch a tender offer has been made. What follows is not a
blueprint for an offeror, but a checklist of the kinds of questions
108. It should be noted, however, that Kennecott was able to obtain a temporary re-
straining order (later vacated) under the Utah Take-Over Disclosure Act which would have
forbidden Curtiss-Wright from soliciting proxies-even though the Utah act makes no
mention of proxy solicitations.
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an offeror and its counsel should consider. The order within each
category is roughly chronological.
a. Formation of the Working Group.
i The offeror. Once the initial decision to proceed with the
tender offer has been made, one of the first questions to consider
is who, within the offeror, needs to know of the tender offer. The
informed group should be kept as small as possible to lessen the
chance of an information leak. Although information leaks have
been known to benefit an offeror, they generally operate to an
offeror's detriment. In a hostile takeover they may jeopardize the
success of the offer by giving target management more time to
organize its defense. In addition, an information leak may drive
up the price of the target corporation's stock in anticipation of the
offer, making the tender offer premium less attractive to the target
company's shareholders."°9 As a matter of course, every informed
party should be strongly warned against making any purchases of
stock in the target company.'
& Offeror's counsel. The offeror's counsel should be famil-
iar with the tender offer area. Because of the intricacies of tender
offer strategy and the fact that the tender offer area abounds with
traps for the unwary, the offeror may have to seek the aid of
outside or special counsel to guide it through the maze of the of-
fer.
ii Local counsel. The increasing number of state takeover
statutes makes it highly probable that a tender offer will involve
the application of at least one, and possibly several, state statutes.
Because of the wide variance in both jurisdictional scope and reg-
ulatory requirements of these statutes, it may be wise to line up
local counsel who have had experience with the statute in ques-
tion.
109. Although this discussion has focused on inadvertent information leaks, mention
should be made of deliberate information leaks which present a different problem. Because
of the potentially drastic impact a leak may have on the market for shares of the target
corporation, an offeror who deliberately leaks may be liable for having engaged in a
"fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative" act in violation of§ 14(e), 15 U.S.C. §78(e)(1976),
as well as liability as a tipper under rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5(1977).
110. An employee of the offeror who buys target shares before an offer is announced,
with knowledge that an offer is to be made, may be exposed to liability under rule lOb-5.
See, e.g., SEC v. Healy, No. 74-4305 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1974), Lit. Release No. 6589
(announcing lob-5 consent judgment involving purchases by North American Phillips em-
ployees prior to announcement of that corporation's tender offer for Magnavox).
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iv. Dealer-manager. An investment banking firm with
tender offer experience can provide useful guidance both as to the
price to be offered for the target's shares and as to the strategy in
approaching the target. One important consideration in selecting
an investment banker is the reputation of the investment banker
among arbitrageurs, through whom much of the stock is typically
tendered. An arbitrageur who builds up a position in the target
company stock stands to incur substantial losses if the offeror de-
cides not to go through with the tender offer. Consequently, arbi-
trageurs depend on the reputation of the investment banker,
particularly if they are unfamiliar with the offer. A dealer-man-
ager, however, is not essential for the success of an offer which is
made for only a small amount of stock or for the stock of a small
target primarily because small offers do not typically attract the
interest of the arbitrageurs.
v. Information agent. A proxy soliciting firm, although not
essential for the success of an offer, is helpful in fielding share-
holder inquiries, distributing copies of the offer to brokers and
dealers, and preparing and disseminating press releases.
vi Depositary and forwarding agent banks. These banks
play a fairly routine role in the tender offer and may be brought in
at the last moment.
b. Analsisof Target Company. An offeror who hopes to be
successful in its attempt to acquire control of the target corpora-
tion must make a careful analysis of information about the target.
The analysis can be broken down into two broad categories: (1)
information concerning the stock of the corporation and (2) other
information concerning the organization of the target and the na-
ture of its business.
i Information concerning the stock of the target company.
(a) Authorized and outstanding shares. One of the first facts
an offeror should ascertain is how many voting shares of the tar-
get are outstanding and how many are authorized but unissued.
The issuance of authorized shares to friendly third parties is a
standard defensive tactic used to thwart takeovers."'
I 11. This tactic was used in the Chris-Craft Industries bid for Piper Aircraft Corpora-
tion. Piper entered into negotiations with Grumman Aircraft for Grumman to purchase
300,000 shares of Piper stock. The deal eventually fell through when the New York Stock
Exchange indicated it had no intention of listing the shares which were to be issued to
Grumman.
Target management, in issuing shares in this type of action, must take care not to vio-
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(b) Large holders. An offeror should determine the identity
of the principal shareholders of the target corporation. The target
company's proxy statement may be the most helpful document for
discovering this information.1 2 Information as to the identity of
large shareholders can be useful to the offeror for several reasons.
Should a large shareholder be one without loyalties to the target
corporation, it may be desirable for the offeror to purchase these
shares before the offer is announced. Alternatively, if all the large
shareholders are officers or directors of the target company, pre-
offer purchases may not be a possibility and success in a hostile
tender offer may be difficult to achieve.
(c) Holdings by management and allies. The amount of
stock owned by, or under option to, the officers and directors may
dictate whether an unfriendly tender offer will succeed. In addi-
tion, it will be necessary to determine how much stock is owned
by, or under option to, allies of the target company or owned by
an Employee Stock Ownership Trust (ESOT). An ESOT may
have considerable defensive value for a target corporation. The
target may seek to issue stock to the trust, either before or during a
tender offer, for the purpose of diluting the voting strength of the
stock sought by the offeror.113 Moreover, it is unclear whether the
trustee of an ESOT may tender stock for the employees; sale of
the issuer's stock is ordinarily not authorized by the ESOT trust
agreement, although the trustee may have a fiduciary obligation
to consider selling if the price is sufficiently attractive.
i Other information about the target company.
(a) Reports to shareholders, SEC reporting documents, regis-
tration statements. Much information that is needed about a tar-
get company can be obtained from documents otherwise filed
with the SEC or sent to shareholders: registration statements, an-
nual and quarterly reports to the SEC, and reports to sharehold-
ers. All of these documents are useful for information concerning
the applicability of state takeover statutes, possible antitrust or
late its fiduciary duties to the corporation. See generally Podesta v. Calumet'Indus. Inc.,
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,433 (N.D. Ill. May 9, 1978).
112. Among other things, Item 5(d) of Schedule 14A requires the person soliciting
proxies to list any person known to be the beneficial owner of 5% or more of any class of
the issuer's voting securities. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-10 (1977).
113. But see Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975) (invalidating issu-
ance by a target of shares to an ESOT during a struggle for control).
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other regulatory agency problems, and the identification of the
target's banks, auditors, and counsel.
(b) Proxy statements. Proxy statements can be a source of
useful information about large stockholders and about the stock-
holdings of management and can provide some background infor-
mation on the target company's directors.
(c) Charter and by-laws. The charter and by-laws of the
target company can provide the offeror with information concern-
ing the number of shares representing control of the target. In par-
ticular, these documents will state whether cumulative voting of
the target corporation's shares is permitted and whether the board
of directors is classified. The charter and by-laws will also reveal
whether there are any special voting requirements for such corpo-
rate reorganizations as mergers, a fact bearing on the number of
shares an offeror may need to acquire to assure the success of its
post-offer plans. Of course, the charter will verify the target com-
pany's state of incorporation, which is important for determining
the applicability of state corporate and takeover law provisions.
(d) Loan agreements and other major contracts. An of-
feror's examination of a target company is not complete without
an analysis of the effect of a successful offer on loan agreements
or other major contracts to which the target company is a party. It
is not uncommon for loan agreements to contain default provi-
sions that may be triggered by any change in the continuity of
management, any merger, or any consolidation of financial ac-
counts with those of another corporation. The offeror should
have knowledge when such default will be exercised and, if so,
when comparable financing will be available.
(e) Employment contracts. An offeror should investigate
the target company's obligation to its employees under long-term
employment contracts. If all the employees will be retained under
the new management of the offeror, no problem arises. In the
event that the offeror decides to replace some employees, how-
ever, the offeror must be aware of the cost involved in terminating
the existing long-term contracts.
c. Obstacles to be Investigated.
L State takeover statutes. The offeror's counsel must decide
which state takeover statutes may be applicable. Each such statute
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should be reviewed to determine, among other things, the permis-
sibility of pre-offer purchases and whether there are any require-
ments as to pre-offer notice to the target or pre-offer publication
of notice of intent to make an offer, the required contents of any
required filing, and the length of time the offer must be kept open.
It should also be noted whether there are provisions for hearings,
and if so, their timing and what types of matters will be heard. In
particular an offeror should be aware if the hearings are to review
only adequacy of disclosure or also fairness of the offer to the
shareholders. As to each potentially applicable statute, the offeror
and its counsel must decide whether to comply with the statute,
challenge it in the courts, or avoid making offers to shareholders
in that state altogether, thereby incurring the risk of litigation by
officials or shareholders of the excluded state.
i Assessment of other legal defenses available to the target
company. Now that the new rules promulgated under the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act have been adopted, it
will be even more important for an offeror to anticipate and ana-
lyze the antitrust implications of the tender offer. Target compa-
nies can be expected to flood both the Justice Department and the
Federal Trade Commission with material as to the adverse effect
of the acquisition on competition in the hopes that one agency will
find an anticompetitive impact sufficient to block the offer. Offer-
ors must assess this potential defense to the offer and be prepared
to defend a charge that the acquisition will have anticompetitive
impacts.
iii Special regulatory problems. Antitrust problems are not
the only regulatory problems which may arise. A wide range of
special regulatory problems may be encountered by the offeror. A
few examples will suffice to illustrate the extent of the problem. If
the target owns a television or radio station, control cannot be
transferred without prior FCC approval. 1 4 If the offeror is a for-
eign corporation, United States laws restrict its ability to own
United States shipping, I 5or to own radio or television licenses,116
and may restrict its ability to own stock in a target which owns
federal mining leases. 117 If the target has Canadian subsidiaries,
114. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (Supp. V 1975).
115. 46 id. § 883 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
116. 47 id. §§ 310(a)-310(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
117. 30 id. § 181 (1976) appears to disqualify a corporation from holding a federal
mining lease if a significant amount of the corporation's stock is held or controlled by a
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approval of Canada's Foreign Investment Review Agency is ne-
cessary before the offeror can take control of those subsidiaries."t
d. Approach and Tactics.
i Pre-offer meeting. Whether a pre-offer meeting is sched-
uled will generally depend on whether the offeror intends a sur-
prise offer. The proliferation of state statutes requiring pre-offer
notice to the target makes surprise offers virtually impossible in
most states. If a surprise offer is not feasible, a pre-offer meeting
to explore the possibility of a friendly transaction will usually be
desirable. A pre-offer meeting may be advantageous even if a sur-
prise offer is possible. A friendly merger transaction is always
cheaper than a contested tender offer because attorneys fees are
lower and there are no soliciting dealer fees. Moreover, a friendly
merger, unlike a hostile tender offer, will result in the offeror ac-
quiring 100% ownership of the target company and will relieve the
offeror of the problem of dealing with minority shareholders. 1 9
it Pre-offer approach. There are numerous ways to ap-
proach a target company. The possibilities range from a "strong
bear-hug" (in which the offeror publicly announces its proposal at
the same time it requests a meeting with the target's management),
to a "friendly bear-hug" (in which the offeror names a price and
makes a specific proposal to the target's board but does not pub-
lish a press release), to a "casual pass" (in which the offeror ex-
presses a strong interest and desire to meet with the target
management but does not name a price).
ii Pre-offer purchases. The offeror must decide whether it
is desirable to purchase stock in the target company before seek-
ing a meeting with the target's management. There are business
advantages in such a course. Pre-offer purchases lend credibility
to the offeror's negotiations with the target management and pre-
vent potentially competing bidders from purchasing readily avail-
able shares on the open market. Purchasing shares of the target
also makes it possible for the offeror to recoup its transaction costs
citizen of a country that would not permit a United States citizen to hold a government
mineral lease.
118. Foreign Investment Review Act, 21-22 Eliz. II, c. 46, § 8(1), at 636 (1973). The
Canadian agency will permit an offer for a target company with a Canadian subsidiary
without prior agency approval if the offeror applies for agency approval at the time it
begins its offer and recognizes that it may be forced to divest itself of the Canadian subsidi-
ary if its application is denied. Id. §§ 8(3)(a)-13 at 637-43.
119. See section 5 supra.
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or perhaps make a profit if the target finds a "white knight" who
is willing to outbid the offeror. Pre-offer purchases, however, are
not without business disadvantages. An offeror who purchases on
the market during a pre-offer period may be committing capital to
an unsuccessful venture should the tender offer fall through and
the price of the stock drop. In addition, the offeror's purchases
may push up the target company's stock, increasing the price
which must be paid in a tender offer. A final disadvantage of pre-
offer purchases is that the offeror runs some risk (albeit small) of
tipping the target corporation.
In addition to business considerations, pre-offer purchases
raise a number of legal questions which must be addressed before
the offeror commits itself to such a course of action. The offeror
must consider reporting requirements under section 13(d) of the
Exchange Act12° and under state law 21 and decide when the ac-
quisitions must be reported under each. An offeror who makes
market purchases prior to the announcement of the offer will also
have to consider what effect the purchases will have on the subse-
quent tender offer under state law.122 On the federal level the of-
feror must insure that the purchases are not viewed as a "creeping
tender offer" which would subject the offeror to liability for fail-
ure to comply with the requirements of section 14(d) of the Ex-
change Act"23 and of applicable state takeover laws. Moreover, if
120. Section 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976), requires disclosure whenever a "per-
son"-a term defined in § 13(d)(3) to include a group acting for the purpose of acquiring,
holding, or disposing of securities -becomes the benefical owner of more than 5% of a
of equity security registered under § 12 of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1976).
121. A recent survey of state takeover statutes indicates six states require filing when
more than a specified percentage (5% in four states; 10% in two states) is acquired. Bartell,
State Take-Over Laws. .4 Survey, in COURSE HANDBOOK FOR PRACTISING LAW INSTI-
TUTE, NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION (1977).
122. Six states prohibit the making of a tender offer if the offeror owns 5% or more of
the target's stock, any of which was acquired within twelve months prior to the offer, unless
the offeror has made a public announcement of its intention to seek control of the target.
Bartell, id at 375-77. The Ohio Division of Securities has recently held that the Ohio pro-
vision to this effect, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §1707.041(2) (Page Supp. 1977), does not to-
tally bar a tender offer if there has been an acquisition within the preceding 12 months
without a public announcement of the offeror's intention. The Division announced that it
will examine the intentions of the offeror at the time of the pre-offer acquisition. In re
Esmark, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 71,374 (July 5, 1977).
123. Courts thus far have tended not to view open market purchases as a tender offer
under § 14(d), 15 U.S.C.§ 78n(d) (1976), at least if there has been no announced intention
to seek control. E.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F.Supp. 579, 598 (W.D. Pa. 1975)
(acquisition of 4.4% by an alleged affiliate many months before the offer). Compare D-Z
Inv. Co. v. Holloway, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,771
($.D.N.Y. 1974) ( urchases of about 16% in open market did not constitute a tender offer)
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the pre-offer purchases are held to be a tender offer, this will raise
problems under rule lOb-13, which prohibits purchases during a
tender offer.' 24 The offeror will want to consider whether prior
purchases will make it easier for the offeror to obtain the target's
shareholder list 25 and also whether it will be able to keep any
short-swing profits on transactions in the target's stock.126
The offeror may wish to consider buying options rather than
buying the target's shares outright. The legal questions raised by
the acquisition of options are much the same as those raised by
outright purchases of stock. The acquisition of an option to ac-
quire more than 5% of a company's shares is as much a reportable
event under section 13(d) of the Exchange Act as is the outright
purchase of such a percentage, if the option is presently exercisa-
ble or is exercisable within sixty days. 127 However, an optionee
may be denied access to the target's shareholder list if the statute
with Loews Corp. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 74 C-1396 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 1974) (open
market purchases were a tender offer when the purchaser had announced to all sharehold-
ers its intention to acquire a specified percentage of the target's shares in order to prevent
third persons from acquiring control).
Important developments with respect to the propriety of pre-offer purchases may be
expected in the pending case of SEC v. Sun Co., No. 78-1055 (S.D.N.Y. March 9, 1978), in
which the SEC has alleged that Sun Company, Inc. and others violated § 14(d) by buying,
on uniform terms, 34% of the stock of Becton Dickinson & Company in a short period of
time at a sizeable premium over market from members of the Dickinson family and a
considerable number of institutional holders.
124. See Sunshine Mining Co. v. Great W. United Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,049 (D. Idaho 1977) (permissible under rule 1Ob-13 to buy
blocks of shares three days prior to announcement of tender offer, the purchases were not
part of the tender offer).
125. Under New York law, for example, a person may examine the shareholder list of a
New York corporation either if the person has been a shareholder of record for at least six
months or if the person has been authorized to make a demand for such examination by
holders of at least 5% of any class of the corporation. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW §624(b) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1977).
126. The Supreme Court has held that short-swing liability under §16(b) of the Ex-
change Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1976), with respect to sales by the beneficial owner of more
than 10% of a company's stock, applies only if the seller was a 10% plus holder at the time
of the matching purchase. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232
(1976). This indicates that an offeror who buys 16% of a target's stock in a single block and
then sells at a profit to a competing bidder within six months would keep the profit. If the
offeror has bought in several transactions, Foremost suggests the offeror would have to
disgorge profits only on sales of stock purchased after the offeror had become a 10%
holder.
127. Under rule 13d-3(d)(1), as amended effective May 30, 1978, a person is deemed to
be the beneficial owner of shares that he has the right to acquire through the exercise of
options within 60 days. 43 Fed. Reg. 18,501 (1978) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-3(d)(l)).
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limits that right to shareholders who are shareholders as of a cer-
tain date.
One possible advantage of options, rather than outright
purchases, is that the offeror can hope to obtain a degree of credi-
bility vis-a-vis the target's management, comparable to that at-
tained with outright purchases, at a fraction of the cash outlay
required for such purchases.
e. Financing the Acquisition.
i Margin rules. The offeror must take great care to avoid
violating the margin rules1 8 in connection with the financing of
the offer. For example, the offeror should not permit an invest-
ment banker to act as an intermediary or "arranger" in seeking
financing. Under Regulation T a broker may not arrange for a
loan (except by a bank, in compliance with Regulation U) other
than on terms upon which a broker itself could make a loan. 129
And a broker may make a loan only if fully collateralized by mar-
gin securities. 130
i Identity of borrower. The identity of the borrower may
have important tax consequences. If the offeror, for example, is a
foreign corporation and if the funds are to be borrowed in the
United States, it may be desirable for the borrowing entity (and
the offeror) to be a United States subsidiary of the foreign corpo-
ration. If these arrangements can be made, any interest paid on
the acquisition loan can be deducted from the income of the target
corporation, assuming that the domestic subsidiary and the target
will be consolidated for United States tax purposes.
f. Antitrust Reporting. The offeror's counsel must consider
reporting requirements both under the present FTC merger notifi-
cation program' 3' and under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.132
g. Preparation of Documents.
128. Section 7(a) of the Exchange Act regulates the extension of credit to be initially
extended and subsequently maintained on any security. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1976).
129. 12 C.F.R. § 220.7(a) (1977).
130. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.3(b), .3(c)(2) (1977). One tender offer was recently enjoined be-
cause of a violation of the margin rules with respect to the arranging of loans by a broker.
Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas Corp., 423 F. Supp. 199 (D. Md.), affd, 546 F.2d 25 (4th Cir.
1976).
131. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
132. See section 2 supra.
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i Tender offer. The tender offer document sets out the ac-
tual terms and conditions of the offer to the target's shareholders.
Even if the offeror intends to have a pre-offer meeting with the
target management, it will be desirable to prepare the tender in
advance of the scheduled meeting. This preparation will enable
the offeror to proceed quickly with a hostile offer in the event that
the target management rebuffs the offeror's overtures.
(a) Terms. A tender offer must specify all the terms of the
offer, including the price to be offered for the shares of the target
and the number of shares to be purchased by the offeror. In con-
junction with the number of shares, the offeror should decide
whether it should require tender of a minimum number of shares
as conditional to the offer. Although setting a minimum reduces
the risk for the offeror, it increases the risk for arbitrageurs, thus
limiting or deterring altogether their participation in the offer.
Other terms which must be drawn include the expiration date and
the withdrawal date for the tendering shareholders. Those dates
must be calculated to comply with any applicable state statutes
and, of course, federal requirements. Although at present federal
law does not require holding open the offer for a specific period of
time, many state statutes do have such a requirement. In addition,
section 14(d)(5) allows tendering shareholders to withdraw their
shares sixty days after the offer commences and up to seven days
after shareholders receive copies of the offer.
In some instances, an offeror may simply decide to exclude
residents of certain jurisdictions to avoid state regulation. In this
case the terms of the offer must specifically not extend to residents
of the excluded jurisdiction. Finally, the offer should include in-
formation about soliciting dealer's fees and dealer-manager's fees.
(b) Disclosure questions. In addition to the terms of the
tender offer, the offeror must determine how much and what
types of information to disclose to target shareholders. There is an
infinite variety of disclosure questions to be considered in prepar-
ing a hostile tender offer. Because of the near certainty that the
target company will challenge the adequacy of disclosure under
the Williams Act and under state takeover statutes, prudent offer-
ors frequently choose to include disclosures of information which
is only arguably relevant.33
133. For helpful analyses of disclosure requirements under the Williams Act, see M.
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Typical disclosure problems that should be addressed include
how much information need be disclosed regarding the offeror
and its affiliates (including financial information),134 the offeror's
plans or intentions with respect to the target, 135 financing (and fi-
nancing repayment plans) for the offer, 136 antitrust questions with
respect to the offer, 137 the applicability of regulatory requirements
concerning the offer, 138 nonpublic information about the target
known to the offeror, 139 the history of contacts between the offeror
and the target, 14 the involvement of the offeror's management in
questionable payments, 4' and any matters called for by state
takeover statutes but not required to be disclosed in Schedule
14D-1.
ii State takeover statute filings. Many state statutes require
not only a filing with the target and with a state agency but also a
publication of a notice of intention to make a tender offer. 142
ii Schedule 14D-1. If the tender offer is made for an eq-
uity security registered under section 12(g) of the Exchange Act,
the offeror must prepare Schedule 14D-1 for filing with the
SEC. 143
LIPTON, CORPORATE TAKE-OVERS: TENDER OFFERS AND FREEZEOUTS 52-82 (1976); Haft,
Disclosure in Cash Tender Offers, 8 REv. SEC. REG. 975 (1975).
134. See Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 483 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1973);
Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
135. See, e.g., Missouri Portland Cement Corp. v. H.K. Porter, 535 F.2d 388 (8th Cir.
1976) (intentions as to liquidation of target).
136. See, e.g., Alaska Interstate Co. v. McMillian, 402 F. Supp. 532 (D. Del. 1975).
137. See, e.g., Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great AtL & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d
Cir. 1973).
138. See, e.g., Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374, 428 (S.D. Tex.
1973) (offer should disclose possible loss of FCC license if FCC disapproves the offeror's
acquisition of control).
139. See, e.g., Sunshine Mining Co. v. Great W. United Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,049 (D. Idaho 1977) (no need to disclose certain
allegedly nonpublic information).
140. Schedule 14D-1, Item 3(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978).
141. Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D.
Ohio 1977) (permitting offeror to proceed with offer, disclosing what it then knew about
merely questionable payments, although an investigation of the payments was still going
on); Gerber Prod. Co. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., No. 77-188 (W.D. Mich. June 2, 1977)
(holding that shareholders of the target company were entitled to full disclosure of certain
questionable payments made by the offeror).
142. Bartell, supra note 121, at 369-71.
143. Exchange Act § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [
iv. Questionnaire. Preparing these documents will generally
necessitate preparing and distributing a questionnaire to the of-
feror's directors and officers requesting relevant information.
v. Press releases. The offeror must decide when to issue a
press release-before or after the offer.
vi Advertisement of offer. If proposed rule 14d-3 is
adopted, a tombstone summary will be sufficient to publicize the
tender offer. Until then, unless the offeror obtains the target's
stockholder list and can mail the offer directly to stockholders, it
may well be necessary to publish the full text of the offer. 144
vii Agreements with agents. The offeror must prepare
agreements with the dealer-manager, the soliciting agent, the de-
positary bank, and the forwarding agent.
viii Demand for shareholder list. If the offeror does not
have a shareholder list, a demand under state law should be pre-
pared. 145 At the same time the offeror should prepare follow-up
papers to enforce the demand in court. An alternative means of
obtaining the list, which may be pursued simultaneously with the
state remedies, is to seek a shareholder list under section 14(e) of
the Exchange Act on the theory that to withhold the list is a
"fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative" act.' 46 Of course, if the
proposed tender offer rules are adopted as currently drafted, ac-
cess to the list of shareholders will be required. 47
ix. Loan agreement or commitment letter. The offeror must
obtain the loan agreement or commitment letter so that the offer
can be financed if it goes through.
x. Notice to antitrust authorities.'4  The changing require-
ments for notice to antitrust authorities are discussed in section 2.
xi Report on Form 3. If the offeror acquires more than
10% of the shares of a class of equity securities registered pursuant
to section 12 of the Exchange Act, it must prepare a statement on
144. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
145. See generally Atkins, Stockholder Lists, 9 REV. SEC. REG. 901 (1976).
146. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
147. See notes 74-78 supra and accompanying text.
148. Seesection 2 supra.
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Form 3 as to the extent of such beneficial ownership, under sec-
tion 16(a) of the Exchange Act.149
xii Report on Form 8-K. Upon completion of the offer, if
the offeror is subject to Exchange Act reporting requirements,1 50 it
must file a Form 8-K if it has acquired "a significant amount of
assets." 15 '
8. Coda
The laws and rules affecting tender offer strategy are changing
rapidly and will continue to change. The swiftness of the changes
and the multiplicity of applicable requirements make tender offer
work uniquely challenging. Changes now in progress may make
tender offers even more complex and expensive and may foretell a
revival in proxy contest activity. I venture to predict, however,
that unless the rules change even more dramatically, tender offers
will continue to flourish, despite their cost and difficulty, as long
as offerors value the shares of target companies at prices well
above those reflected in the securities markets. This is because the
tender offer continues to be an effective method by which control
of corporations can be acquired despite the opposition of incum-
bent management.
149. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976).
150. Issuers having securities registered under § 12 of the Exchange Act must file peri-
odic reports under § 13(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1976).
151. 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 31,003.
